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HATE SPEECH IN THE SCHOOLS: A POTENTIAL 
CHANGE IN DIRECTION 
Kevin W. Saunders* 
The law regarding free expression and students in the public schools has long 
been somewhat confused.  An early Supreme Court vindication of student speech 
rights has eroded over the years.  Yet, it is perhaps unclear how great the erosion 
has been and how much of the original recognition still stands.  This has left the 
lower courts rather unwilling to protect school students from hate speech, at least in 
cases where there has not been a history of such speech leading to disruption or 
even violence.  Only recently has there been some sign of change in that regard, 
with a few courts coming to recognize that the Supreme Court cases allow 
restrictions on student use of racist, sexist, or homophobic invective toward other 
students, even when such disruption and violence are lacking. 
This article will argue that those recent court decisions are justified under 
Supreme Court precedent.  The article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of school speech.  The school hate speech cases in the 
lower courts are then considered in Part II.  That treatment splits the cases into two 
eras, the first running from the Supreme Court’s recognition of free expression 
rights in the schools to the first significant erosion, and the second from that 
erosive case to the present.  In each era, the lessons drawn by the lower courts 
regarding hate speech are presented but are followed with the lessons it is 
suggested could have been drawn that would have been more protective of the 
targets of hate speech.  Part III looks at the more recent decisions protecting 
students from hate speech and argues that these cases are correctly decided.  Lastly, 
Part IV looks to the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on student speech 
to argue that the lessons suggested from the earlier cases are still valid. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S SCHOOL SPEECH CASES 
An analysis of the regulation of hate speech in the public schools must begin 
with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.1  Tinker grew 
out of a protest against the United States’ involvement in Vietnam.2  As a part of 
the protest, a number of students wore black armbands.3  The district’s principals 
had decided that such a display would be met with a demand to remove the bands 
and suspension for those who refused.4  A number of students did refuse and 
challenged their penalties under the First Amendment.5 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the special characteristics 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor and Charles Clarke Chair in Constitutional Law, Michigan State University.  A.B., 
Franklin & Marshall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan.   
 1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 2. Id. at 504. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
2011] HATE SPEECH IN THE SCHOOLS 167 
of the schools must be taken into account in any free expression analysis, but the 
Court said that these rights do exist in the school context, stating “[i]t can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”6  It was important to the Court, in 
holding that the students’ rights had been violated, that the protest had been silent 
and passive, with no interference with the educational process or the rights of 
others.7  There was no disruption of any class, and while there was some hostility 
expressed by other students outside the classroom, there were no threats of violence 
or actual violence.8  The district may have feared disturbance, but the Court said 
“in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough 
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”9 
The Court noted that any disagreement with the views of the majority may 
cause trouble or raise fear of disturbance, at least in the form of an argument.10  
Despite that potential outcome, it is something we must abide.11  Rather, 
[i]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a 
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused 
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.12 
In that regard, the Court said “the record fails to yield evidence that the school 
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of 
other students.”13 
It is interesting and important to note that the school system had allowed the 
wearing of other potentially message-bearing items, including campaign buttons 
and a German Iron Cross.14  What was singled out was one particular item bearing 
on an issue that was in controversy throughout the country.15  The school elected to 
support one side of an ongoing debate: support of the United States’ involvement in 
Vietnam could be expressed, but disagreement was barred.  This use of the schools 
to suppress one side of a societal debate is particularly troubling.16  This may be the 
focus of the Court’s statement that “students may not be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.  They may not be 
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.”17 
The extension of Tinker to prevent schools from limiting hate speech within 
their confines would seem unwarranted.  It is argued elsewhere that the real 
problem raised by the action of the principals in Des Moines was this imposition of 
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a favored view in an ongoing political debate.18  Hurling racial expletives at 
another student is not participation in an ongoing political debate, even if there is 
such a debate over whether such limitations should be allowed.  At any rate, Tinker 
seems to have been the high water mark for free speech in the schools, and later 
cases call into question its continuing strength. 
The first such case is Board of Education v. Pico.19  Analyzing the case is 
complicated by its procedural context and the lack of a majority opinion.  The case 
may be seen as another victory for free expression rights in the schools, but its 
relevance is limited.  The issue in Pico was access to books in a school library.20  
Conservative members of the local school board expressed concern over the 
presence of books in the library that they characterized as “anti-American, anti-
Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.”21  After receiving recommendations 
from a committee of parents and school staff who reviewed the books in 
controversy for “‘educational suitability,’ ‘good taste,’ ‘relevance,’ and 
‘appropriateness to age and grade level,’” the Board largely rejected the committee 
recommendations and ordered the removal of most of the books on their original 
list, reprieving one book and allowing access to a second with parental approval.22 
When a group of students challenged the removal of the books, the Court 
found only that the complaint merited a trial.23  The lower court had granted the 
school district summary judgment, which is allowable only if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact to be resolved at trial; that is, even taking the available 
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the district would be entitled 
to judgment.24  The problem, according to the Court, was that in First Amendment 
cases the intent of the government is crucial, and that intent had not been probed at 
a trial.25 
As mentioned, there was no majority opinion.  A plurality of Justice Brennan, 
with only Justices Marshall and Stevens in complete support and with Justice 
Blackmun in partial support, began by recognizing that school boards must have 
broad discretion in managing their schools’ affairs.26  The plurality accepted the 
position of the district that “local school boards must be permitted ‘to establish and 
apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,’ and that 
‘there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for 
authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political.’”27  But, the 
district must exercise its discretion in harmony with the requirements of the First 
Amendment.28 
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The discretion of the district applies most strongly to the curriculum itself.29  
The board must decide what to teach, but the plurality saw the library in a different 
light.30  Students have not only whatever right Tinker provides to express 
themselves, but also a right to receive information.31  The Court stated: 
Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of 
curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values.  But we 
think that petitioners’ reliance upon that duty is misplaced where, as here, they 
attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory 
environment of the classroom, into the school library and the regime of voluntary 
inquiry that there holds sway.32 
So, what limitations would the First Amendment pose to school board attempts to 
limit the availability of books in their libraries?  In answer to that question, the 
plurality looked not so much to result but to motive, stating: 
[School boards] rightly possess significant discretion to determine the content of 
their school libraries.  But that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly 
partisan or political manner.  If a Democratic school board, motivated by party 
affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republicans, 
few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional rights of the students 
denied access to those books.  The same conclusion would surely apply if an 
all-white school board, motivated by racial animus, decided to remove all books 
authored by blacks or advocating racial equality and integration.  Our Constitution 
does not permit the official suppression of ideas.33 
Since the plaintiffs had alleged that the Board’s decision was based on a concern 
that the books were “anti-American” 34 and contrary to the Board members’ 
“personal values, morals and tastes,” the board decision was suspect, and the 
complaint merited a trial.35  The grant of summary judgment was vacated and the 
case was remanded.36 
As mentioned, Justice Blackmun joined the plurality only in part.  He did not 
rest on a view of the role of school libraries but wrote more generally of the limits 
on states, saying “the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because 
state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons.”37  Applying 
that principle to the schools, he said: 
In my view, we strike a proper balance here by holding that school officials may 
not remove books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or 
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social perspectives discussed in them . . . .  [T]he school board must “be able to 
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,” 
and that the board had something in mind in addition to the suppression of partisan 
or political views it did not share. . . .  First Amendment principles would allow a 
school board to refuse to make a book available to students because it contains 
offensive language, or because it is psychologically or intellectually inappropriate 
for the age group, or even, perhaps, because the ideas it advances are “manifestly 
inimical to the public welfare.”38 
Justice Blackmun’s position seems consistent with the view expressed above that 
the evil to be addressed is the political suppression of ideas.39  Even then, he would 
allow the suppression of ideas that are not simply discomforting to the majority but 
that are “inimical to the public welfare.”  What would fit that classification better 
than racial epithets? 
There is still a fifth vote to be accounted for in the decision to remand.  That 
vote came from Justice White.  While he agreed that there was a factual dispute and 
that summary judgment had been inappropriate, he criticized the plurality for 
“issu[ing] a dissertation on the extent to which the First Amendment limits the 
discretion of the school board to remove books from the school library.”40  That 
position certainly limits the effect of language in the plurality opinion, leaving only 
the conclusion that motive matters and that political motive is of special concern. 
The next case, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,41 resulted from what 
was characterized as a lewd speech given at a high school assembly.42  Fraser, a 
student, gave the speech in nomination of a fellow student for a student government 
office.43  The Court described the speech as “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit 
sexual metaphor.”44  Fraser gave the speech after having been warned by two 
teachers, who knew its content, that there could be consequences.45  Student 
reaction ran from hooting, yelling, and sexually suggestive gestures on the part of 
some to embarrassment on the part of others, some as young as fourteen.46  Fraser 
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was suspended and removed from the list of potential graduation speakers for 
violating a school rule against “[c]onduct which materially and substantially 
interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane 
language or gestures.”47 
When Fraser’s challenge to the action reached the Supreme Court, the Court 
decided that Tinker was not controlling.48  The Court saw a “marked distinction 
between the political ‘message’ of the arm-bands in Tinker and the sexual content 
of respondent’s speech in this case.”49  In Tinker, there had been “a nondisruptive, 
passive expression of a political viewpoint” that had not affected the educational 
process while the speech in Fraser disrupted a participatory exercise in student 
government, which could be relevant under Tinker.50  Going beyond Tinker, the 
Court pointed to the role of the schools in inculcating the fundamental values and 
civility needed for democracy to flourish.51  The Court noted: 
These fundamental values and “habits and manners of civility” essential to a 
democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and 
religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular.  But these 
“fundamental values” must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities 
of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.  The 
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and 
classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.52  
This language would seem to distinguish between political speech and racist 
invective at least as well as it does between political speech and vulgarity. 
The Court recognized that it had ruled in Cohen v. California53 that far more 
offensive language than that uttered by Fraser was protected when expressed in 
public, but said “[i]t does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an 
offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the 
speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children 
in a public school.”54  The Court went on to say: 
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the 
use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.  Indeed, the “fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” disfavor the 
use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others.  Nothing in 
the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression 
are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.  The inculcation of these values is truly 
the “work of the schools.”  The determination of what manner of speech in the 
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classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school 
board.55 
Again, consider how much more injurious, offensive, and threatening racist speech 
is compared to somewhat lewd speech, and then note that the Court allowed the 
suppression of such lewd speech in Fraser. 
Turning to the most recent of this line of cases,56 we come to what has become 
known as the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” case.57  The case, Morse v. Frederick,58 gets its 
name from a banner unfurled at a high school sponsored event.59  The torch relay 
for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City was to pass through Juneau, 
Alaska.60  The principal of Juneau-Douglas High School, a school on the route of 
the torch, decided to make an event of the relay by allowing students and staff to 
leave class to line the street down which the relay would proceed.61  As the torch 
and its accompanying camera crews passed, Frederick, a senior at the high school, 
and some friends unfurled a fourteen foot long banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS.”62  The banner was easily seen by students and others.63  The principal, 
Morse, crossed the street and ordered that the banner be taken down.64  While his 
friends were compliant, Frederick refused.65  The principal then took the banner, 
and Frederick was suspended from school.66  The action was based on a belief that 
the banner promoted drug use, in violation of school rules—rules that applied both 
in school and at school sponsored events and trips.67 
Frederick filed suit seeking not only a declaratory and injunctive vindication of 
his free speech rights but also monetary damages.68  When the case reached the 
Supreme Court, it found that his free expression rights had not been violated.69  The 
Court accepted, as reasonable, the principal’s belief that the sign advocated the use 
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of marijuana.70  It also distinguished this advocacy of drug use from taking a 
political position on the legalization of marijuana.71 
Given the Court’s understanding of the message, the question became whether 
the schools can restrict student speech in the context of a student event and, 
presumably, a fortiori in the school itself, reasonably believed to promote drug 
use.72  The Court determined that doing so was not a violation of the First 
Amendment, and in doing so, it gave its most recent view of the meaning of the 
school speech cases. 
With regard to Tinker, the Court found the facts there “quite stark, implicating 
concerns at the heart of the First Amendment.”73  The speech in Tinker was 
political expression the protection of which is “at the core of what the First 
Amendment is designed to protect.”74  Where the only interest on the part of the 
school was the prevention of the sort of discomfort that a minority political view 
may bring, that could not justify the suppression of student speech.75 
Proceeding on to Fraser, the Court said the mode of analysis employed there 
“is not entirely clear.”76  While the Court 
was plainly attuned to the content of Fraser’s speech, citing the “marked 
distinction between the political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the 
sexual content of [Fraser’s] speech.” . . .  [T]he Court also reasoned that school 
boards have the authority to determine “what manner of speech in the classroom or 
in school assembly is inappropriate.”77 
Declining to resolve completely the lack of clarity, the Court was willing to “distill 
. . . two basic principles”:78 
First, Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”  Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the 
school context, it would have been protected.  In school, however, Fraser’s First 
Amendment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment.”  Second, Fraser established that the mode of analysis set 
forth in Tinker is not absolute.  Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly 
did not conduct the “substantial disruption” analysis prescribed by Tinker.79 
While the school district argued that Fraser should be interpreted to allow the 
suppression of the speech at issue because it was offensive in the sense used in 
Fraser, the Court declined.80  The Court said: 
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We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass 
any speech that could fit under some definition of “offensive.”  After all, much 
political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some.  The 
concern here is not that Frederick’s speech was offensive, but that it was 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.81 
Agreeing that Frederick’s speech was offensive would have been stretching the 
class of speech Fraser allowed to be suppressed, perhaps beyond the breaking 
point.  Racist speech, however, can be included in the Fraser concept with far 
greater ease.  Such speech is easily more offensive than the sexually suggestive—
but not explicit—speech in Fraser. 
Turning to the application of the case law to the treatment of the banner,82 the 
Court found the government interest in deterring student drug use to be important 
and even perhaps compelling.83  This government interest has its effect on the 
permissibility of speech regulation in the schools.  The Court noted that 
Tinker warned that schools may not prohibit student speech because of 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” or “a mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”  The danger here is far more serious and palpable.  The particular 
concern to prevent student drug abuse at issue here . . . extends well beyond an 
abstract desire to avoid controversy.84 
That made it reasonable for the principal to take the actions she did.85 
There was an important concurrence in Morse.  Justice Alito, joined by Justice 
Kennedy, expressed their view of the majority decision, and since their votes were 
necessary to forming a majority, any limits expressed cannot be ignored.  The two 
justices joined the Court’s opinion on the understanding that it addressed only 
illegal drug use and “provides no support for any restriction of speech that can 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including 
speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing 
marijuana for medicinal use.’”86  The concurrence went on to say, “I do not read 
the opinion to mean that there are necessarily any grounds for such regulation that 
are not already recognized in the holdings of this court.”87  The concern was over 
argument that had been offered in the case that school officials should be allowed 
                                                                                                     
 81. Id.  
 82. The Court did also briefly consider the school newspaper case, Hazelwood School District v. 
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to censor any speech that interfered with the school’s educational mission.88  Since 
an educational mission could include views on political and social issues, the 
schools could not be allowed to censor contrary speech.89  Drugs, on the other 
hand, were seen to be a threat to student safety—potentially as serious a threat as 
violence within the school—therefore, the restrictions on speech were accepted by 
the Court.90 
II.  LOWER COURT CASES ON HATE SPEECH IN SCHOOLS FROM TINKER TO THE 
RECENT PAST 
The analysis in this section will look primarily at two distinct eras, or at least 
what should have been two distinct eras.  The first begins with Tinker and lasts 
through Fraser.  Pico is not used to split that first era in two on the grounds that it 
says little about speech by students and serves primarily to focus Tinker on political 
speech.  The second era is from Fraser th rough the present.  After a discussion of 
those eras and an analysis of a potential change in direction in this area, the impact 
of Morse will be discussed. 
A.  From Tinker to Fraser 
1.  Tinker Lessons Drawn by the Lower Courts 
There were not many cases considering school hate speech in the era between 
Tinker and Fraser, but the cases that did reach the lower courts were resolved 
based on the question from Tinker as to whether the student speech at issue “would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school.”91  The analysis of that issue 
tended to be highly fact specific, with courts delving into the history of hate speech 
and race relations at the schools adopting the speech limitations. 
Melton v. Young92 demonstrates this reliance.  The case grew out of a situation 
at Brainerd High School, a public school in Chattanooga, Tennessee.93  The school, 
which had been integrated in 1966, retained its nickname “Rebel” and Dixie as its 
pep song from its pre-integration all-white days.94  In 1969, continuing controversy 
over the use of the Confederate flag and Dixie led to demonstrations, disrupted 
classes, and other disturbances, to the point where a citywide curfew was initiated 
for four nights.95  Police had to be called to the school, and at one point, the school 
was closed.96 
A committee appointed to study the situation recommended that the 
Confederate flag no longer be used as a school symbol and that Dixie no longer be 
the school pep song, although it was recommended that the nickname “Rebel” be 
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retained.97  The school board adopted the recommendations and directed the school 
administration to develop a student code of conduct consistent with the 
recommendations.98  The code prohibited the use of “provocative symbols on 
clothing” and said that all displays of the Confederate flag and Confederate soldiers 
were to be removed from the school premises.99 
Melton, despite being informed of the new rules, wore a jacket with a 
Confederate flag on its sleeve to school.100  He was asked to remove it but refused 
and went to class.101  After complaints from both faculty and students, he was again 
asked to remove the jacket or told he would have to leave school.102  Although he 
left, he came back the next day with the same jacket.103  He said he was 
demonstrating pride in his Confederate heritage but was again told to leave and not 
return in the jacket.104 
When Melton challenged the order as a violation of his free expression rights, 
the Sixth Circuit adopted the conclusion of the trial court that “[t]he Principal had 
every right to anticipate that a tense, racial situation continued to exist at Brainerd 
High School . . . and that repetition of the previous year’s disorders might reoccur 
if student use of the Confederate symbol was permitted to resume.”105  The 
appellate court said that the district judge had undertaken a careful consideration of 
the law and the situation at the high school and was justified in concluding that 
the record in the present case reflects quite clearly that there was substantial 
disorder at Brainerd High School throughout the 1969-70 school year, that this 
disorder most materially disrupted the functioning of the school, so much so that 
the school was in fact closed upon two occasions, that much of the controversy the 
previous year had centered around the use of the Confederate flag as a school 
symbol and that the school officials had every right to anticipate that a tense racial 
situation continued to exist as of the opening of school in September 1970.106 
It was clear that the history of disturbances made the difference, establishing the 
real and substantial fear of disruption that Tinker seemed to demand.107 
The Fifth Circuit, in a somewhat different procedural context, showed the 
same attention to the history of strife at a school in determining whether an 
injunction against the use of the Confederate battle flag and the name “Rebels” 
violated student first amendment rights.  In Augustus v. School Board,108 the court 
had to consider a mix of first amendment and equal protection issues.  The school 
system was under the continuing jurisdiction of the district court to implement 
desegregation.109  The district court had issued a permanent injunction against the 
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use of the Confederate flag because it saw the symbol and the “Rebel” name as 
standing in the way of establishing a unitary school system.110 
There was history tying the symbol and name to disruptions.  In the 1972-73 
school year, which was the fourth year of any significant integration for the district, 
its high school experienced racial disturbances.111  There were four major 
confrontations involving fighting between black and white students and a number 
of lesser disturbances.112  Law enforcement officers were called to the school and 
remained for the year; the school was closed twice.113  The court said that one 
source of the racial tension was the use of the Confederate symbols.114  The court 
concluded that the injunction was not a violation of student first amendment rights, 
noting that student expression may be limited where that expression leads to 
violence and disruption.115 
2.  The Tinker Lesson That Could Have Been Drawn 
Setting aside the fact that Tinker actually phrased its test in the form of a 
disjunction of substantial disruption or interference with the rights of others, with 
the second disjunct ignored until much later cases,116 it is not really clear that the 
first disjunct should have been seen as requiring the sort of violence and physical 
disruption looked for by the lower courts. 
An understanding of the disruption that should have been found sufficient to 
justify limits on student speech might have been found in Brown v. Board of 
Education.117  The Court in Brown asked itself the simple—at least in its 
wording—question: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the 
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be 
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities?” and answered that question by stating: “We believe that it does.”118  
The Court said: 
To separate [children in elementary and high schools] from others of similar age 
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.119 
The conclusion was that educational segregation, in itself, deprives minority 
children of equal educational opportunity: separate but equal was an 
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impossibility.120  Segregation implies racial inferiority, and that affects motivation 
to learn and retards educational and mental development.121 
The issue in Brown was, of course, legally established segregation, rather than 
the sting of racist speech, but the effect may well be the same.  It may even be that 
racist speech directed at a child in the classroom, cafeteria, or elsewhere in school 
could have a stronger impact on a child than finding himself or herself in a single 
race school, especially if the legal details of that result are not explained to the 
child.  Many children would not have understood the law behind segregated 
schools and may not have suffered from the inferiority that concerned the Court, 
although certainly older students would have. 
But, what of the child who hears hate speech in the schools and sees that it is 
tolerated by the school authorities?  It would seem that acceptance of racist speech, 
if the schools do not attempt to stop it, would lead to the same belief that society 
has accepted a theory of racial inferiority.  Perhaps someone versed in the 
complexities of free expression law would not draw the same conclusion, but that is 
a bit much to expect of an elementary or even high school student.  Even with an 
explanation, it might well be seen as a majority protection for the assertion of 
minority inferiority. 
It would, then, seem reasonable to conclude that hate speech has a negative 
impact on the educational process.  It is inherently disruptive of the schools’ 
mission.  Unless Tinker is limited to violence and the effects of noise—and the 
language of the case does not seem so limited—hate speech is disruptive in the 
sense necessary to allow its suppression.  The political speech in Tinker might 
merit protection up until the point of disruption.  How else would we distinguish 
political distaste from interference with the educational process?  But, all hate 
speech may be seen as disruptive, even without indication of violence.  This may 
best be seen in the limiting case of a single minority student who is constantly 
subjected to racist speech.  Facing such overwhelming odds, he or she may not 
respond with any level of violence.  But, the subject of such abuse will not receive 
the education the school system is charged with providing.  The educational 
process will have been disrupted in a way that should allow, under a combination 
of Tinker and Brown, the suppression of the speech of the other students.122 
B. Post-Fraser 
In the years following Fraser, the number of cases involving school limitation 
on hate speech grew significantly.  They might also be seen to have increased in 
complexity.  The lower courts seemed to continue their reliance on the substantial 
disruption aspect of Tinker, apparently not seeing any real change resulting from 
the Fraser decision.  Some of the later cases did, at least, begin to recognize the 
disjunctive nature of the Tinker test.  After examining the work of the courts in this 
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era, how Fraser could be seen as adding authority to bar hate speech will be 
examined. 
1. Fraser (and leftover Tinker) Lessons Drawn by the Lower Courts 
One of the first cases123 in this era at the federal appellate level was the Tenth 
Circuit case West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260.124  In the Kansas 
school district at issue in that case, there had been a number of racial incidents.125  
It was in response to those incidents that the district adopted a “Racial Harassment 
and Intimidation” policy.126  The policy prohibited racial harassment or 
intimidation through name calling or the use of racial slurs.127  It also prohibited 
possession in school or at school events of written material that is “racially divisive 
or creates ill will or hatred.”128  Among the examples given of such material was 
the Confederate flag.129 
The incident that gave rise to the case occurred when a seventh grade student, 
while in mathematics class, drew a Confederate flag on a piece of paper.130  When 
the student was suspended for three days, the student’s parents sued the district, 
alleging violations of the student’s constitutional rights, the most important such 
violation being to the student’s First Amendment rights.131 
In examining the First Amendment issue, the court carefully examined the 
historical background for the policy.132  That background included a series of 
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verbal confrontations between black and white students at the high school.133  
Some of the confrontations were of a sartorial bent: some white students wore 
shirts with an image of the Confederate flag, and some black students wore shirts 
with an “X”, referring to Malcolm X.134  The confrontations drew attention in the 
wider community, and groups such as the Aryan Nation and Ku Klux Klan took 
advantage of what they saw as an opportunity to begin distributing their 
materials.135  There were additional incidents on school buses and at football games 
as well as a fight involving a student wearing a Confederate flag headband.136  
Racist and threatening graffiti also began to appear in and around the school.137  It 
was against that background that the district policy was adopted, and the policy 
seemed to result in a significant decline in racial problems.138 
In the court’s view, the students were well aware of the policy, and the student 
knew that drawing the flag was a violation.139  The question was whether the 
drawing of the flag, in what the student saw as a “peaceful and nonthreatening” 
situation and in which he had no intent to harass, was protected by the First 
Amendment.140  The court concluded that it was not.141 
The court accepted that the student’s display of the flag could be considered 
political speech that would be protected outside the schools and repeated the Tinker 
sobriquet that “students do not ‘shed the constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”142  On the other hand, the court recognized 
that a “school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic 
educational mission . . . .  Thus, where school authorities reasonably believe that a 
student’s uncontrolled exercise of expression might ‘substantially interfere with the 
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students,’ they may forbid 
such expression.”143  While undifferentiated fear of a disturbance was insufficient 
under Tinker to allow suppression of speech, here there was good reason to believe 
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that the display of the Confederate flag would cause disruption and interfere with 
the security of other students.144 
Shortly after West, the Third Circuit entered the arena with Saxe v. State 
College Area School District.145  That case, too, was a challenge to a school system 
anti-harassment policy.  The district’s Anti-Harassment Policy provided a 
definition of “harassment” that would prove to be too broad.146  “Harassment 
means verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or perceived race, religion, 
color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other personal 
characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with 
a student’s educational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or 
offensive environment.”147  “Other personal characteristics” was a broad category 
that included “clothing, physical appearance, social skills, peer group, intellect, 
educational program, hobbies or values, etc.”148 
The policy was challenged because of a perceived effect it would have on 
comments regarding the sinfulness of homosexual conduct.149  The court found the 
breadth of the policy an unacceptable limit on first amendment rights: 
Insofar as the policy attempts to prevent students from making negative comments 
about each others’ “appearance,” “clothing,” and “social skills,” it may be brave, 
futile, or merely silly.  But attempting to proscribe negative comments about 
“values,” as that term is commonly used today, is something else altogether.  By 
prohibiting disparaging speech directed at a person’s “values,” the Policy strikes at 
the heart of moral and political discourse--the lifeblood of constitutional self 
government (and democratic education) and the core concern of the First 
Amendment.150 
This limit on comments regarding beliefs, rather than invective directed at core 
and unchangeable characteristics, such as race, does raise significant free 
expression issues. 
Turning to the analysis of First Amendment rights in the schools, the court in 
Saxe began with a discussion of Tinker, noting that undifferentiated fear of 
disturbance is insufficient and that speech regulation by the schools is only 
permitted if the speech would be a substantial disruption of, or interference with, 
the educational process or the rights of other students.151  The fear required by 
Tinker must be “specific and significant . . . not just some remote apprehension of 
disturbance.”152 
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Unlike the West court, the Saxe court also discussed Fraser as part of a 
concession that “[s]ince Tinker, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of 
narrow categories of speech that a school may restrict even without the threat of 
substantial disruption.”153  The court took the Fraser Court’s discussion of the 
difference between allowing offensive speech by adults in public and not allowing 
Fraser’s nomination speech in school as an indication that the Fraser result is 
limited.154  “According to Fraser, then, there is no First Amendment protection for 
‘lewd,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘indecent,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ speech in school.”155  It also 
seems clear that the category of the “plainly offensive” was limited, in the court’s 
view, to the other categories in the quotation, despite the redundancy in the 
statement that such a view would cause.156 
The court found the policy to violate the First Amendment, expressing a 
willingness to allow the suppression of student speech only if the real potential for 
disruption it saw as called for by Tinker existed or the speech was vulgar or lewd, 
as in Fraser.157 
[T]he Policy does not confine itself merely to vulgar or lewd speech; rather, it 
reaches any speech that interferes or is intended to interfere with educational 
performance or that creates or is intended to create a hostile environment.  While 
some Fraser-type speech may fall within this definition, the Policy’s scope is 
clearly broader. . . .  [T]he Policy, even narrowly read, prohibits a substantial 
amount of non-vulgar, non-sponsored student speech.  [The district] must therefore 
satisfy the Tinker test by showing that the Policy’s restrictions are necessary to 
prevent substantial disruption or interference with the work of the school or the 
rights of other students.158 
The school system policy was limited to speech that had the “purpose or effect 
of . . . substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance or . . . 
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment,” yet there is the 
implication that the “substantial disruption or interference with the work of the 
school” of Tinker would be lacking.159  It would seem that an interference with 
educational performance should also constitute an interference with the work of the 
school.  The problem, however, was that “the Policy punishes not only speech that 
actually causes disruption, but also speech that merely intends to do so . . . .  This 
ignores Tinker’ s requirement that a school must reasonably believe that speech 
will cause actual, material disruption before prohibiting it.”160  Furthermore, while 
the court did agree that prohibiting speech that would “substantially interfer[e] with 
a student’s educational performance” could satisfy Tinker, to include speech that 
“creat[es] an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment” was more 
problematic.161  Even recognizing the other prong of the Tinker test, the court said 
                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 212. 
 154. Id. at 213. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 212-13. 
 157. Id. at 216-17. 
 158. Id. at 216. 
 159. Id. at 216-17. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2011] HATE SPEECH IN THE SCHOOLS 183 
that the hostile environment aspect of the school system’s provision did not require 
the severity or pervasiveness that might be necessary to meet the Tinker factor of 
“intrud[ing] upon . . . the rights of other students.”162  The court stated: 
Because the Policy’s “hostile environment” prong does not, on its face, require any 
threshold showing of severity or pervasiveness, it could conceivably be applied to 
cover any speech about some enumerated personal characteristics the content of 
which offends someone.  This could include much “core” political and religious 
speech: the Policy’s “Definitions” section lists as examples of covered harassment 
“negative” or “derogatory” speech about such contentious issues as “racial 
customs,” “religious tradition,” “language,” “sexual orientation,” and “values.”  
Such speech, when it does not pose a realistic threat of substantial disruption, is 
within a student’s First Amendment rights.163 
The policy in Saxe clearly went beyond the concerns addressed in West, as 
well as those addressed in Tinker and Fraser.  By including sanctionable comments 
that called into question another student’s values, the policy reached matters clearly 
within the protection of the First Amendment.  Much truly political debate can be 
seen as calling into question the values held or expressed by the opposing party.  
The suppression of such speech is a violation of expression rights even in the 
schools, as clearly held by Tinker.  The line between calling into question the value 
of accepting homosexuality and insulting another because of the other’s sexual 
orientation may not be easy to draw, but it is an important distinction.  The policy 
at issue in Saxe did not simply prohibit personal insult or the use of derogatory 
epithets, but it could be interpreted to extend to language that simply caused 
discomfort for those of a different sexual orientation.  The case may not have been 
a true circuit split with the West court.  It may instead be seen to result from serious 
differences between the policies involved. 
The next federal appellate court to address the issue, coming back to racial 
concerns, was the Sixth Circuit in Castorina ex rel Rewt v. Madison County School 
Board.164  The case arose in a Kentucky high school where two students were both 
suspended twice for wearing T-shirts decorated with the Confederate flag.165  The 
principal determined that the shirts were a violation of a school dress code, which 
banned clothing with, among other things, any “illegal, immoral or racist 
implication.”166  There may not have been any racist intent on the part of the 
students.167  The shirts they wore were commemorative T-shirts from a Hank 
Williams, Jr. concert.168  The front of the shirts had an image of the musician while 
the back of each shirt had two Confederate flags and the legend “Southern 
Thunder.”169  The students said they had worn the shirts to honor the birthday of 
Hank Williams, Sr. and to express their Southern heritage.170 
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In determining whether the school could prohibit the shirt, this court too 
looked to Tinker and Fraser.171  The court said that Fraser had not altered Tinker’s 
core principles “under which public school may regulate student speech.”172  With 
regard to Fraser, the court said that case 
concerned a school’s decision to discipline a student after he used “offensively 
lewd and indecent speech” . . . .  The Court found that this was not protected 
speech and that the school had an interest in teaching students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior that provided some room for a school to regulate 
speech which would otherwise be protected.173 
It seems an odd reading of Fraser.  The speech there did not fall into some 
exception to the First Amendment.  Rather, the Supreme Court said that the 
school’s interest was sufficient to allow regulation.174  Treating the speech in 
Fraser as unprotected, however, allowed the court here not to consider any 
expansion Fraser may have worked on Tinker.175 
This case does point out the difficulty that the Confederate flag may raise.  It is 
not solely a symbol of hate, as the swastika or a burning cross may be.  It is also a 
symbol of regional pride in the southern part of the United States.  It is true that the 
practices of that region were, at the time the flag was officially used, as racist as 
they could possibly be.  Nonetheless, there are other aspects to that regional pride, 
and an appeal to those other aspects may not be an appeal to racist sentiments.  
Determining the message behind the wearing or drawing of a Confederate flag may 
not be an easy task, and an examination of the activity within the context of any 
racial tensions in the school or past use of symbols may be required.176  
Another example of the difficulties inherent in determining the meaning of at 
least some speech is shown by a Third Circuit case, Sypniewski v. Warren Hills 
Regional Board of Education.177  The case arose in a school that had a history of 
racial hostility.178  A white student had been suspended for wearing a Halloween 
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costume at school consisting of overalls, a straw hat, “black face” make-up, and a 
noose around his neck.179  Students wore Confederate flag clothing, told racist 
jokes, and distributed racist material.180  Some students “formed a ‘gang-like’ 
group known as ‘the Hicks,’ and observed ‘White Power Wednesdays’ by wearing 
Confederate flag clothing.”181  On one such Wednesday, a student walked down 
one of the school’s main halls waving a large Confederate flag.182 
The pattern of racist incidents continued throughout the year.183  It affected 
classes as lessons were replaced by discussions of race relations.184  It spilled over 
into the community as a white student who associated with black students was 
physically threatened at his home.185  Racist graffiti and hostile counter-graffiti 
appeared on school walls.186  There was also at least one interracial fight at the 
school.187 
In response, the school system adopted a policy that barred various sorts of 
racial harassment as well as intimidation and expression that created racial hatred, 
ill will, and division, and the school provided examples of materials that would 
violate the policy, including the Confederate flag.188  It would appear that, given 
the background, the policy’s limitations would stand up to scrutiny under Tinker.  
The system had a real fear of disruption and concern for the safety of its students, 
and the fear would seem real and substantial. 
The problem, however, was the target for the suspension at issue: a Jeff 
Foxworthy T-shirt.189  Foxworthy, a comedian, is known for his “You might be a 
Redneck . . .” routine, in which he recites indications that one might be a 
Redneck.190  This shirt was headed “Top 10 reasons you might be a Redneck Sports 
Fan,” followed by reasons such as: “Your carpet used to be part of a football field”; 
“You know the Hooter’s [sic] menu by heart”; “You think the ‘Bud Bowl’ is real”; 
and “You wear a baseball cap to bed.”191  The T-shirt hardly seems racist, 
especially when worn by a white student, since the humor is at the expense of 
Rednecks.  Nevertheless, when the student refused to turn the shirt inside out, he 
was suspended for three days.192 
When the plaintiff challenged the racial harassment policy, the Third Circuit, 
applying Tinker, said that the facts would likely support a ban on the Confederate 
flag, but that the flag was not at issue.193  The Foxworthy T-shirt did not have the 
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history of causing disruption that the flag had.194  In fact, it had been worn to 
school before, and there had been no negative reaction.195  Nonetheless, the history 
could have reached the shirt.  To justify the ban, the school system claimed that the 
word “redneck” connotes racial intolerance and that the word is directly associated 
with hicks and hence the gang “the Hicks,” which was at the center or the racial 
unrest in the high school.196 
The court found no basis for any claim that the Hicks ever called themselves 
the Rednecks, or that the word “redneck” had been used at the school to harass or 
intimidate.197  The court also would not accept an argument that the words were 
sufficiently synonymous to allow an acceptable ban on “hicks” to carry over to 
“redneck.”198  Synonymy would not suffice.199  The school had over reacted by 
trying to limit any reference to poor or farming southerners, rather than limiting 
their reaction to more specific references to the school group that had been at the 
core of the strife.200 
There was a partial concurrence and partial dissent to the majority opinion.201  
Judge Rosenn saw sufficient similarity between “redneck” and “hick” as to justify 
the ban on the Foxworthy T-shirt.202  More importantly, Judge Rosenn offered a 
seemingly broader interpretation of the law.  He looked to Fraser, saying: 
Under such circumstances as confronted the [School Board], the Supreme Court 
has held that officials are not entirely helpless.  Even under less disruptive and 
racially harassing circumstances than the [Board] confronted, the Court has 
recognized the highly appropriate function of public school education “to prohibit 
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”  The Court upheld in 
that case a disciplinary rule proscribing “obscene” language and sanctions for a 
lewd speech by a high school student.  Here, we have obscenities and much more.  
The Court in Fraser emphasized the importance of public education to prepare 
pupils for citizenship and the “fundamental values of habits and manners of 
civility essential to a democratic society [that tolerates] divergent political and 
religious views, [but which] also take into account consideration of the 
sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow 
students.”203 
Even if we need to tolerate such language in the adult world, Judge Rosenn saw the 
schools as different.204  To the detriment of the schools, “the majority gives words 
of enmity and wickedness at heart in a children’s ambience an unjustifiable sense 
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of propriety.”205  For at least this judge, the difference between the schools and the 
public marketplace of ideas was a real difference.206 
There is an interesting issue over the applicability of this line of cases, from 
Tinker right through the hate speech cases, to elementary schools.  In S.G. ex rel 
A.G. v. Sayreville Board of Education,207 a Kindergarten student was suspended for 
telling a friend “I’m going to shoot you” while playing in the school yard during 
recess.208  Given the reasonable concerns schools have over violence, even by 
young children, the suspension was held not to be a violation of the student’s free 
expression rights.209  As the court said, “where the school officials determined that 
threats of violence and simulated firearm use were unacceptable, even on the 
playground, the balance tilts in favor of the school’s discretionary decision-
making.”210 
What was more interesting was what the court had to say about elementary 
schools.  Since the court was the same Third Circuit that had found constitutional 
violations in Saxe and Sypniewski,211 it might have seemed a good court for the 
plaintiff.  But, the court noted that none of its cases, nor for that matter the 
Supreme Court cases in the area, discussed restrictions at the Kindergarten level.212  
The court cited a Seventh Circuit case, Muller ex rel Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse 
School,213 for the proposition that Tinker and its progeny are unlikely to apply to 
elementary schools.214  
It added other quotes and citations for the proposition that elementary schools 
are different:  
In a recent decision, this court has noted that: ‘any analysis of the students’ rights 
to expression on the one hand, and of schools’ need to control behavior and foster 
an environment conducive to learning on the other, must necessarily take into 
account the age and maturity of the student.’”215 
The court went on: “Various cases have held that ‘[a]ge is a critical factor in 
student speech cases,’” quoting again the Seventh Circuit Muller decision, and 
adding another Seventh Circuit quote, “age is a relevant factor in assessing the 
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extent of a student’s free speech rights in school.”216  Returning to its own cases, 
the court cited Walker-Serrano v. Leonard217 for its observation that “[t]he 
significance of age in this inquiry has called into question the appropriateness of 
employing the Tinker framework to assess the constitutionality of restrictions on 
the expression of elementary school students.”218 
The recognition that the youngest of students require more protection or 
somehow merit less freedom of expression is interesting.  It is true that the 
Supreme Court has noted the particular susceptibility of young children to 
influences in some of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.219  Acts that might 
not be an establishment of religion when older students are involved may be an 
establishment for more impressionable younger students.220  This would seem to 
speak not to the student as speaker but to the student as the recipient of expression. 
So, why this difference?  If the analysis of school hate speech would be limited 
to the “substantial disruption” prong of Tinker, the distinction would have to be 
based on the difference age could make with regard to that disruption.  If the 
disruption can only be a physical disruption, younger children seem less likely to 
react in such a manner to speech.  Particularly, if the concern is over physical 
violence, younger children may be less likely to resort to such acts, or at least to do 
serious harm.  Elementary school children are simply more amenable to control by 
school authorities.  So, if the focus is solely on physical disruption, the distinction 
would seem to cut the other way.  The age distinction makes more sense under a 
broader understanding of Tinker.  If disruption can be found in the psychological 
impact of speech and its harmful effects on the ability of the individual to benefit 
from education, then elementary school children may well need more protection 
than high school students. 
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic offer an explanation for this distinction in 
arguing that children generally require special protection against hate speech.221  
They note that children may be “particularly susceptible to the wounds words can 
inflict.”222  It is through hate speech that young minorities come to hate themselves, 
as the authors see evidenced by stories of children trying to “scrub the color out of 
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their skin.”223  As they point out, young children have fewer coping mechanisms.224  
More damaging still, they may internalize the sentiments expressed.  If they 
internalize some sense of inferiority, that would have the impact that the Court has 
found to be of such great concern.225 
There is a distinction between elementary and high school, and it makes sense 
to recognize that distinction in the context of hate speech.  But if the distinction is 
to be recognized, it would seem to be on a broader reading of Tinker.  The school 
system’s ability to limit hate speech with regard to younger children must be based 
on a disruption of the educational process, not a physical disruption but a 
psychological disruption.  If psychological disruption is sufficient, that would also 
seem to have application at the secondary level, even if perhaps the levels of 
speech to be tolerated would differ. 
There are other cases addressing school hate speech in the post-Fraser era. 
These cases moved away from the disturbance aspect of Tinker to recognize a right 
on the part of students to be free from hate speech.  They are not discussed here but 
will be presented later in demonstrating the potential development of a new 
approach in this area.226 
2. The Fraser Lesson That Could Have Been Drawn 
Fraser could have been read to allow school authorities greater leeway in 
prohibiting hate speech.  The Fraser Court, speaking of the use of sexual metaphor, 
said that the speech “[b]y glorifying male sexuality . . . was acutely insulting to 
teenage girl students.”227  As with Brown, marginalization, this time of females, 
could be seen as having a negative impact on education.  The impact of such 
speech, and of racist speech, does disrupt the education process and should serve as 
a basis, even sticking to the Tinker rationale, for limits on such expression in the 
schools.  Hate speech, if anything, should be seen as more insulting, and as 
intentionally insulting, to its target population.  If this “insult[] to teenage girl 
students” was sufficient to allow the restriction in Fraser, the greater hostility of 
hate speech, and the resulting stronger insult, should be seen as justifying limits. 
The Fraser Court went on to say: 
The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools 
and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.  Even the most 
heated political discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the 
personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.228 
Here, too, the Court’s language would seem to speak better to hate speech than to 
the speech offered by Fraser.  Hate speech is, again, more insulting and seemingly 
a stronger attack not only on the sensibilities but on the character of its targets. 
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The Court in Fraser went on to call the inculcation of society’s values “truly 
the ‘work of the schools.’”229  Among those values are a commitment to equality 
and dignity.230  If the schools are to inculcate these values, then it should be just as 
“highly appropriate [a] function of public school education” to prohibit hate speech 
in schools as it was to bar the “vulgar and offensive terms” in the speech in 
Fraser.231  Fraser recognized that “schools must teach by example the shared 
values of a civilized social order” and that teachers and other students are role 
models in setting that example.232  “The schools . . . may determine that the 
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that 
tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct . . . .”233  So also should 
the schools be allowed to determine that “the essential lessons of civil conduct and 
the inculcation of the shared values of society cannot be conveyed in a school that 
tolerates” hate speech.234  Furthermore, the Court’s allowance of restrictions on 
speech that is “highly threatening to others” speaks far more strongly to hate 
speech than to sexually suggestive speech.235  Whether the girls in the audience 
were or were not insulted, they certainly would not have felt as threatened as would 
the targets of hate speech.236 
Returning to the issue of offensiveness, the Morse Court did discuss the nature 
of the sort of speech that could be so considered.237  The school district had argued 
that Fraser should be interpreted to allow the suppression of the speech at issue 
because it was offensive in the sense used in Fraser. 238  The Court declined stating: 
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We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass 
any speech that could fit under some definition of “offensive.”  After all, much 
political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some.  The 
concern here is not that Frederick’s speech was offensive, but that it was 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.239 
Agreeing that Frederick’s speech was offensive would have been stretching the 
class of speech Fraser allowed to be suppressed, perhaps beyond the breaking 
point.  Racist speech, however, can be included in the Fraser concept with far 
greater ease.  Such speech is easily more offensive than the sexually suggestive, but 
not explicit, speech in Fraser. 
III.  SIGNS OF A NEW DIRECTION 
This section will begin with what might seem an odd choice of material, the 
discussion of an opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit that has been vacated.240  Although the opinion was vacated, it sets out the 
arguments that the Supreme Court’s precedents allow limiting hate speech in the 
schools in a stronger manner than any of the opinions by other courts.241  It should 
be pointed out that the order to vacate was not out of any stated disagreement by 
the Supreme Court with the analysis of the Ninth Circuit.  Instead it was a 
procedural decision.  The original opinion had been the appeal of a denial of a 
motion for preliminary injunction.242  That denial was upheld, but by the time the 
case went on to the Supreme Court, the district court had come to its final 
resolution of the case, and the appellate opinion had become moot.243  Thus, the 
status of the opinion may prevent it from having value as precedent, but it still has 
whatever intellectual strength the reader thinks it demonstrates. 
The case, Harper v. Poway Unified School District, was a split decision, with a 
majority decision by Judge Reinhardt and an interesting dissent by Judge 
Kozinski.244  It was not another Confederate flag case but involved T-shirts, in a 
high school, that condemned other students on the basis of their sexual 
orientation.245 
There had been a history of conflict over issues of sexual orientation at Poway 
High School.246  As a way to further tolerance, the school allowed a group called 
the Gay-Straight Alliance to hold a “Day of Silence.”247  The day was not 
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uniformly well received.248  There was a series of incidents, including anti-
homosexual comments and altercations, with the altercations leading to 
suspensions.249  A week after the “Day of Silence” another group of students 
organized a “Straight-Pride Day.”250  The message of tolerance was replaced by T-
shirts with comments derogatory toward homosexuals, leading to more 
altercations.251 
The next year, a second “Day of Silence” was planned after the Gay-Straight 
Alliance met with the principal to seek ways to reduce tensions and possible 
altercations.252  On the “Second Day of Silence,” the plaintiff, who believed the 
real purpose of the day was to promote homosexual activity, wore a T-shirt with “I 
Will Not Accept What God Has Condemned,” handwritten on the front and 
“Homosexuality Is Shameful ‘Romans 1:27’” handwritten on the back.253  The next 
day he came to school in a T-shirt with “Be Ashamed, Our School Embraced What 
God Has Condemned” handwritten on the front and the same legend as on the prior 
day on the back.254 
On that second day, a teacher noticed several students in class talking about 
the shirt.255  Now noticing the shirt, the teacher told the plaintiff that he believed it 
to be inflammatory and, concerned about the prior year’s altercations, sent the 
plaintiff to the office for violating the school’s dress code.256  The principal decided 
that, given the conflicts of the previous year, he would not let the student wear 
what he interpreted as an inflammatory T-shirt on campus.257  The student was 
given the opportunity to remove the shirt and return to class but refused.258  The 
student asked to be suspended, but instead the principal simply kept him in the 
office the rest of the day, with no suspension and no disciplinary record.259 
The student filed suit alleging a number of constitutional violations under the 
rights to free speech and free exercise of religion, the Establishment Clause, the 
Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause, as well as a claim under state 
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law.260  The district court dismissed all but the speech and religion claims and with 
regard to those claims refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the 
school.261  It was the plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal of that denial that reached the 
Ninth Circuit.262 
The basis for the district court’s denial of the injunction, and one that the 
appellate court could have quite easily and simply affirmed, was that the school, 
under Tinker, had a sufficient basis to predict a substantial disruption of and 
interference with the educational mission.263  Given the history surrounding the 
“Day of Silence” in the previous year and the ongoing conflict in the schools, 
surely Tinker would permit this limit on student speech.  Rather than affirming on 
that basis, however, the Ninth Circuit based its decision on a different part of the 
rule derived from Tinker.264 
The court used the second aspect of the Tinker test, looking to whether the 
speech activity the school sought to suppress “‘intrudes upon . . . the rights of other 
students’ or ‘colli[des] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let 
alone.’”265  The court said that the wearing of the T-shirt collided with the rights of 
other students in a fundamental way.266  The court stated: 
Public school students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core 
identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation, have a right 
to be free from such attacks while on school campuses.  As Tinker clearly states, 
students have the right to “be secure and to be let alone.”  Being secure involves 
not only freedom from physical assaults but from psychological attacks that cause 
young people to question their self-worth and their rightful place in society. . . .  
Speech that attacks high school students who are members of minority groups that 
have historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and physical abuse, and made 
to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate them, as well as to damage their 
sense of security and interfere with their opportunity to learn.267 
The court went on to note that the impact is not only on psychological health and 
well-being but on educational development as well.268  School administrators do 
not have to tolerate this, and the court concluded that the school had a right to bar 
                                                                                                     
 260. Id. at 1173. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 1183-84. 
 264. See id. at 1177-80.  The appellate court also rejected the plaintiff/appellant’s claims based on the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment.  See id. at 1186-91.  That subject is beyond the scope of this 
work and will not be addressed.  The topic is, however, addressed in Kristi L. Bowman, Public School 
Student’s Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (2007).  Professor 
Bowman sees little reason to believe that the Supreme Court will resort to a free exercise analysis when 
it comes to in-school hate speech.  Id. at 196-97. 
 265. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
508 (1969)). 
 266. Id. at 1778. 
 267. Id. (citation omitted). 
 268. Id. at 1179.  For additional material on the impact of hate speech and on bullying in general, see, 
e.g., Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and 
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004); Amy Lovell, 
“Other Students Always Used to Say, ‘Look at the Dykes’”: Protecting Students from Peer Sexual 
Orientation Harassment, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 617 (1998). 
194 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
the T-shirt in question on the ground that it was “injurious to gay and lesbian 
students and interfered with their right to learn.”269 
Addressing the treatment of this prong of Tinker in Saxe, the court argued that 
Saxe had conflated the two prongs of Tinker.270  That court had only briefly alluded 
to interference with the rights of others, and in the view of the Harper court had, 
“suggest[ed], perhaps inadvertently, that injurious slurs may not be prohibited 
unless they also cause substantial disruption.”271  “That,” the Harper court said, 
“clearly is not the case. The two Tinker prongs are stated in the alternative.”272 
The court wanted to make clear the limitations of its decision.  It does not 
reach limitations on political debate, the sort of speech that was at issue in Tinker.  
While the court recognized that there is political disagreement over homosexual 
acts and rights in the United States, it noted that there had been similar 
disagreement over racial equality and religion.273  Just as that disagreement should 
not require allowing students to wear shirts declaring the inferiority of racial 
minorities or suggesting a less than pleasant after-life for religious minorities, 
homosexuals should be similarly protected.274  There may be a right to raise 
political issues, but “[i]t is not necessary to do so by directly condemning, to their 
faces, young students trying to obtain a fair and full education in our public 
schools.”275  More generally: 
It is essential that students have the opportunity to engage in full and open political 
expression, both in and out of the school environment. . . .  Limitations on student 
speech must be narrow, and applied with sensitivity and for reasons that are 
consistent with the fundamental First Amendment mandate.  Accordingly, we limit 
our holding to instances of derogatory and injurious remarks directed at students’ 
minority status such as race, religion, and sexual orientation.276 
The court went on to address a concern raised by the dissent that the holding 
does not reach offensive words directed at majority groups.277  In response, the 
court noted a difference between historically oppressed minorities and those groups 
that have enjoyed a privileged social, economic, and political status.278  “Growing 
up as a member of a minority group often carries with it psychological and 
emotional burdens not incurred by members of the majority.”279  Verbal assaults 
against members of majority groups may still be barred by Tinker, but not because 
of their psychological impact.280 They are, the court said, more likely to be justified 
by Tinker’s concern over substantial disruption or Fraser’s allowance of a ban on 
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plainly offensive speech.281  Even so, the court left open “the possibility that some 
verbal assaults on the core characteristics of majority high school students would 
merit application of the Tinker “intrusion upon the rights of other students” 
prong.282 
The court also considered the objection that, since the T-shirt was worn in 
response to the “Day of Silence,” the ban was a form of viewpoint discrimination.  
The court stated: 
[P]ublic schools may permit, and even encourage, discussions of tolerance, 
equality and democracy without being required to provide equal time for student 
or other speech espousing intolerance, bigotry or hatred. . . .  [B]ecause a school 
sponsors a “Day of Religious Tolerance,” it need not permit its students to wear T-
shirts reading, “Jews Are Christ-Killers” or “All Muslims Are Evil Doers.” . . . 
Similarly, a school that permits a “Day of Racial Tolerance,” may restrict a student 
from displaying a swastika or a Confederate Flag.  In sum, a school has the right to 
teach civic responsibility and tolerance as part of its basic educational mission; it 
need not as a quid pro quo permit hateful and injurious speech that runs counter to 
that mission.283 
While a response to an argument for tolerance may have to be allowed, that 
response may not take the ad hominem form that occurred here.284  That response 
should be an argument against toleration rather than an attack on those the speaker 
would prefer not to tolerate.285 
A dissent by Judge Kozinski argued that the school had offered no lawful 
justification for banning the T-shirts in question.286  He did not even find a basis in 
Tinker’s concern over disruption, considering the evidence inadequate.287  Evidence 
that in the previous year, when shirts with inflammatory messages and derogatory 
remarks had been worn, there were physical altercations would not do.288  Judge 
Kozinski found it unclear from the record that the messages on the shirts were 
involved in the prior year’s altercations.289  He also said that the record did not 
indicate how close the messages on last year’s shirts were to those on the plaintiff’s 
shirts, nor did it indicate how the shirts and other events may have interacted last 
year to cause the results.290 
Turning to the “rights of others” language in Tinker, Judge Kozinski was of the 
view that the phrase “can only refer to traditional rights, such as those against 
assault, defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay 
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 282. Id. at 1183-84 n.28.  It may be more common that the messages the majority finds objectionable 
are political rather than personal.  For example, in Gillman v. School Board, 567 F.Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D. 
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 283. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1185-86 (citations omitted). 
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 286. Id. at 1192 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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with the First Amendment is well established.”291  He disputed the majority’s 
conclusion that the shirts violated the rights of others by disparaging their 
homosexual status to the extent that they interfere with the right to partake in the 
educational process.292 
What may be most interesting, however, about the dissent are the comments 
expressing some concern about the state of the law.  Looking at the two most 
relevant Supreme Court cases, Judge Kozinski said: 
Reconciling Tinker and Fraser is no easy task.  The Supreme Court majority in 
Fraser seems to have been influenced by the indecorousness of Fraser’s 
comments, which referred to a fellow student in terms that could be understood as 
a thinly-veiled phallic metaphor.  The curious thing, though, is that Fraser used no 
dirty words, so his speech could only have been offensive on account of the ideas 
he conveyed—the ideas embodied in his elaborate double-entendre.  So construed, 
however, Fraser swallows up Tinker, by suggesting that some ideas can be 
excluded from the high school environment, even if they don’t meet the Tinker 
standard.293 
That is the position argued for here in the discussion of Fraser.294  It was not an 
argument that Fraser has swallowed up Tinker, but that Tinker may be limited to 
cases in which the school suppresses one side of a real political debate in the adult 
community.295  In Harper, the T-shirts were not a part of the political debate but 
invective against students on one side.  Fraser also allows the limitation of certain 
language that is broad enough to include that offered here.  It does not suggest that 
certain ideas may be excluded, but certain language may be.  Fraser could express 
his belief that his candidate was the best for the office, but his sexual metaphor was 
out of bounds.  Harper could argue that society should not value tolerance, but that 
was not an excuse for using insults.296 
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 296. Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007), provides a recent example of 
the sort of reaction that should be protected.  A couple of students, believing that the faculty, 
administration, and other students were prejudiced against conservatives and conservative views and 
that a forum for conservative views was lacking at the school, formed the Hudson High School 
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also affiliated with the national organization High School Conservative Clubs of America (“HSCCA”).  
Id.  The school was “one of only eleven pilot schools selected to participate in the ‘First Amendment 
Schools’ program, a national initiative designed to transform the way in which schools teach the rights 
and responsibilities of democratic citizenship.”  Id.  The principal seemed receptive and told the students 
that he was pleased that they were getting politically involved.  Id. 
The problem arose when the students put up ten posters advertising their first meeting.  Id. at 
173.  The posters included the web address of the HSCCA.  Id.  A faculty member checked the web site 
and found links to video footage of beheadings by Islamist terrorists.  Id.  There was a warning by the 
link that the material available there was extremely graphic.  Id.  The posters were removed, and the 
assistant principal explained the reasons to the students.  Id.  He said that the HSCCA was anti-gay and 
promoted violence, and that the web site had links to the beheadings.  Id.  He also said that 
many of the teachers were offended by the content of the HSCCA website such as (1) 
calls to take down the rainbow (gay rights) flag and put up the American flag, (2) the 
website’s support for the Second Amendment, (3) the inclusion of a “12-Step Liberal 
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Also of interest is Judge Kozinski’s conclusion, in which he shows that he 
recognizes the concerns of the school authorities and of the majority.  It is worth 
setting out at length: 
I acknowledge that the school authorities here found themselves in a difficult 
situation and, in light of the circumstances, acted well . . . .   
  I also have sympathy for defendants’ position that students in school are a 
captive audience and should not be forced to endure speech that they find 
offensive and demeaning.  There is surely something to the notion that a Jewish 
student might not be able to devote his full attention to school activities if the 
fellow in the seat next to him is wearing a t-shirt with the message “Hitler Had the 
Right Idea” in front and “Let’s Finish the Job!” on the back.  This t-shirt may well 
interfere with the educational experience even if the two students never come to 
blows or even have words about it. 
  Perhaps school authorities should have greater latitude to control student 
speech than allowed them by Justice Fortas’s Vietnam-era opinion in Tinker. . . .  
Perhaps the narrow exceptions of Tinker should be broadened and multiplied.  
Perhaps Tinker should be overruled.  But that is a job for the Supreme Court, not 
for us.  While I sympathize with my colleagues’ effort to tinker with the law in this 
area, I am not convinced we have the authority to do so, which is why I must 
respectfully dissent.297 
Judge Kozinski seems to have been unable to accept that there may have been a 
legal basis for the majority’s results, while agreeing that perhaps that result ought 
to be the law. 
While the court’s analysis was based on Tinker, an analysis based on Fraser 
would certainly come to the same result as the majority view in Harper.298  The 
                                                                                                     
Recovery Program,” and (4) its position in favor of abolishing the national education 
association (“NEA”). 
Id. at 174. 
If that had been the basis for removing the posters, then it would have reached political speech 
that should be protected.  Instead, the school relied on the violent nature of the accessible videos.  Id. at 
177.  The court rejected that basis, noting that the web sites would be accessed outside of school and 
only by those choosing to do so—the site had been blocked on the school’s computer, but that had not 
been challenged.  Id. at 177-78.  It also noted the Harper decision and said that if, after the vacation of 
the opinion, had it been good law, it still would not have applied, since that opinion addressed only 
material that was derogatory or injurious to minorities.  Id. at 179.  The court ruled that the students had 
a right to put up the posters with the URL of the HSCCA.  Id. at 180. 
  The point is that the comments about the rainbow flag were political commentary.  They were 
not personal attacks on gay students but were instead directed against the political agenda symbolized 
by that flag.  The system seemed to know that it could not rely on the grounds presented by the assistant 
principal.  Further, the court did not discuss any concerns over these comments being an attack on 
homosexual students, even when it discussed Harper’s application to the videos.  Id. at 179-80. 
 297. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1207 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 298. In DePinto v. Bayonne Board of Education, 514 F. Supp. 2d 633 (D.N.J. 2007), the court 
suggested at least the potential for this approach.  The case involved students who were protesting the 
imposition of a school uniform rule at their elementary school.  Id. at 636.  They wore buttons with what 
appeared to be a photo of members of the Hitler Youth with a slashed red circle and the legend “No 
School Uniforms.”  Id.  The photo did not contain any visible swastikas, and the people in the photo 
were not engaged in the Nazi salute, but it seems that it was uncontested that those depicted were Hitler 
Youth.  Id.  The district sent home letters to the students’ parents saying that the background image was 
objectionable to many of the school district’s citizens and that their attorney had told them that the 
buttons did not constitute free speech.  Id. 
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Harper majority’s expression of the concerns, and even some of the concern 
expressed by the dissent, could hardly be improved upon.  Under either approach, 
there is the recognition that students may be sufficiently impacted as to allow limits 
on hate speech.  It may be sufficient to affect the rights of the target students to 
receive an education, and it would seem that it would come within the Fraser 
concerns over schools teaching civility.  Either way, minorities would be protected 
from hate speech in the schools. 
The use of Fraser in this context, rather than the Harper court’s use of Tinker, 
gains support from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Scott v. School Board.299  The 
issue was, once again, a student suspension for displaying the Confederate flag.300  
The Eleventh Circuit held that the ban was not a violation of the student’s free 
expression rights and did so without laying out a basis of a showing of real concern 
over material and substantial disruption.301  The court noted that the freedom of 
expression “stands against the unique backdrop of a public school.”302  While 
students do not lose their First Amendment freedoms at the school house door, 
“those rights should not interfere with a school administrator’s professional 
observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore could lead to, an 
unhealthy and potentially unsafe learning environment for the children they 
serve.”303  An unhealthy environment, as distinguished from an unsafe 
environment, does not seem to require the fear of a substantial disturbance that 
Tinker may be seen to envision.  Psychological impact may well be sufficient. 
Rather than supply its own analysis, the court adopted the reasoning of the 
district judge.  The district judge recognized, in addition to the authority to limit 
appreciably disruptive speech, that 
from Fraser, even if disruption is not immediately likely, school officials are 
                                                                                                     
Once the school district got to court, it found out that the attorney was wrong, and the court 
issued a preliminary injunction against the ban on the buttons.  Id. at 650.  Given the political nature of 
the message, it seems the correct decision.  The buttons expressed disagreement with a school policy, 
clearly a valid political issue in the community.  They were not supportive of Nazis but instead 
suggested that the imposition of uniforms would be the sort of regimentation on which the Nazi regime 
was built. 
The school system had failed to recognize that subtlety and argued that, under Fraser, the photo 
was lewd, vulgar, indecent or plainly offensive.  Id. at 640.  The court disagreed but said: 
This Court does not, and need not, address the more difficult case of a student who wears 
or displays obvious symbols of hate or racial divisiveness.  If the student in this case had 
displayed a swastika, a confederate flag, or a burning cross, then this Court’s analysis 
would differ greatly.  While it is unclear whether this Court would so find under Tinker 
or Fraser (it is eminently more likely that such a symbol would create a disturbance 
under Tinker), this Court believes that such a display would likely be “plainly offensive” 
under Fraser; however, the resolution of that dispute is not before this Court. 
Id. at 644 n.7 (citation to footnote only).  Thus, at least this court would seem to take the position that 
the sort of analysis the Ninth Circuit’s vacated opinion applied under its view of Tinker could be applied 
under Fraser instead.  It would not seem that the symbols of Nazism could be unique in this regard, and 
presumably the court would extend that potential analysis to hate speech more generally. 
 299. 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 300. Id. at 1247. 
 301. Id. at 1249. 
 302. Id. at 1247. 
 303. Id. (emphasis added). 
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charged with the duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values 
conducive both to happiness and to the practice of self-government.”  To do so, 
they must have the flexibility to control the tenor and contours of student speech 
within school walls or on school property, even if such speech does not result in a 
reasonable fear of immediate disruption.304 
Recognizing that Fraser allows the restriction of vulgar and offensive words, the 
court determined that the real issue was whether the display of the Confederate flag 
was vulgar and offensive.305  That issue is the subject of debate.  For some, as the 
court recognized, the flag is a historical symbol that conveys certain philosophical 
and political views revolving not around slavery but around states’ rights.306  To 
others, it is nothing more than a symbol of racism.  The court said that even the 
terms of the debate, 
[w]ords like “symbol”, “heritage”, “racism”, “power”, “slavery”, and “white 
supremacy” are highly emotionally charged and reveal that for many, perhaps 
most, this is not merely an intellectual discourse.  Real feelings—strong feelings—
are involved.  It is not only constitutionally allowable for school officials to 
closely contour the range of expression children are permitted regarding such 
volatile issues, it is their duty to do so.307 
The court said that a part of the school’s mission is to teach its students to engage 
each other in civil terms, not in words that are highly offensive to others.308  Where 
a symbol is so associated with racism that it will provoke ill will and hatred, the 
school may take action.309 
Just one more case shows that more courts seem to be coming to recognize this 
right of school authorities to protect their minority students from derogatory 
comments.  In Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204 Board of 
Education,310 the court considered another case growing out of a “Day of Silence.”  
The day had been celebrated at the high school for several years, sponsored by the 
Gay/Straight Alliance.311  Some of the students wore labels indicating their 
participation and remained silent during the day, except when required to speak in 
class or to a member of the staff.312  Some of the students and staff wore shirts 
bearing the message “Be Who You Are.”313 
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The legal issue arose when a student group wanted to hold a “Day of Truth” 
the day after the “Day of Silence.”314  The school agreed that they could do so on 
the same basis as the previous day.315  They could remain silent and could display 
pins, shirts, and the like with a message of “Be Happy, Be Straight” or “Straight 
Alliance.”316  A student who professed religious beliefs against homosexuality 
went beyond these messages and wore a T-shirt that had “My Day Of Silence, 
Straight Alliance” on the front and “Be Happy, Not Gay” on the back.317  School 
officials made the student black out the “Not Gay” portion of the message.318  The 
case went to court seeking damages for that action and an injunction against future 
similar actions.319 
The court found no violation of the student’s constitutional rights.320  The court 
said “school officials may prohibit a public high school student from displaying 
negative statements about a category of persons, including homosexuals, that are 
inconsistent with the school’s educational goal of promoting tolerance.”321  The 
court distinguished the message displayed from the message “Be Happy, Be 
Straight.”  The latter was said to be a positive statement about being straight, not a 
directly negative comment about being gay.322  If school officials had prevented 
that positive statement, as alleged, there would have been a violation.323  “Since, on 
the previous day students were permitted to display messages supporting being 
homosexual, the next day’s suppression of a message supporting being 
heterosexual should be understood as viewpoint discrimination . . . .”324 
The trial court’s denial of an injunction was appealed to the Seventh Circuit as 
Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District,325 and the appellate court, 
with Judge Posner writing, ruled that the injunction should have been granted.326  
Interestingly, however, the disagreement between the courts was over application, 
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rather than theory.327  As to application, the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
expression “Be Happy, Not Gay” could be seen as a play on words since “gay” is 
not only a word indicating homosexual orientation but also a synonym of 
“happy.”328  The court also concluded that the comment might not even be seen as 
derogatory since it really said no more than the “Be Happy, Be Straight” shirt that 
the school would allow.329  While there may be a strong nonpropositional 
difference between two sentences seemingly making the same point, the “Be 
Happy, Not Gay” shirt was not seen as an offensive way to say the same thing as a 
“Be Happy, Be Straight” shirt.330  In this court’s view, “Be Happy, Not Gay” “is 
only tepidly negative; ‘derogatory’ or ‘demeaning’ seems too strong a 
characterization.”331  It was, at any rate, seen as “highly speculative” that the shirt 
in question would “poison the educational atmosphere.”332 
The plaintiff’s success on appeal was only partial.  The Seventh Circuit refused 
to enjoin more generally the enforcement of the school’s rule, and much of the 
court’s analysis in that regard agreed with the position taken by the district court 
and espoused here.333  The Seventh Circuit sided with the right of the schools to 
place some limits on student speech that stretched beyond the lewd speech of 
Fraser or the drug oriented speech of Morse.334  The court stated: 
A heavy federal constitutional hand on the regulation of student speech by school 
authorities would make little sense.  The contribution that kids can make to the 
marketplace in ideas and opinions is modest and a school’s countervailing interest 
in protecting its students from offensive speech by their classmates is undeniable.  
Granted, because 18-year-olds can now vote, high-school students should not be 
“raised in an intellectual bubble,” . . . which would be the effect of forbidding all 
discussion of public issues by such students.  But Neuqua Valley High School has 
not tried to do that.  It has prohibited only (1) derogatory comments on (2) 
unalterable or otherwise deeply rooted personal characteristics about which most 
people, including--perhaps especially including--adolescent schoolchildren, are 
highly sensitive.  People are easily upset by comments about their race, sex, etc., 
including their sexual orientation, because for most people these are major 
components of their personal identity—none more so than a sexual orientation that 
deviates from the norm.  Such comments can strike a person at the core of his 
being.335 
The court recognized that there was evidence that at least suggested that 
“adolescent students subjected to derogatory comments about such characteristics 
may find it even harder than usual to concentrate on their studies and perform up to 
the school’s expectations.”336  And, in a statement that is very important for the 
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position argued for here, the court said “[m]utual respect and forbearance enforced 
by the school may well be essential to the maintenance of a minimally decorous 
atmosphere for learning.”337 
Bringing Supreme Court case law to bear, the court noted the need for a 
realistic fear of a substantial disruption before the school can limit student speech; 
but the court said that concern is not limited to avoiding violence.338  That was not, 
after all, the concern in either Fraser or Morse.  The Seventh Circuit’s reading of 
those cases led to the conclusion that “if there is reason to think that a particular 
type of student speech will lead to a decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in 
truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school—symptoms therefore of substantial 
disruption—the school can forbid the speech.”339  While the application of the rule 
to the shirt at issue may have been flawed, the rule itself “seeks to maintain a 
civilized school environment conducive to learning, and it does so in an even-
handed way. . . .  The list of protected characteristics in the rule appears to cover 
the full spectrum of highly sensitive personal-identity characteristics.”340 
IV.  THE IMPACT OF MORSE 
It seems clear that Morse should be read to allow restrictions of student speech 
when the speech presents some danger to student welfare.  Justice Alito, in his 
necessary concurrence, showed concern over the dangers found in drug use.341  
While he would not allow the suppression of all speech that interfered with the 
educational mission of the school, fearing that such a standard would allow the 
schools to suppress political and social views contrary to those they considered part 
of the educational mission, drugs presented a danger.342 
If Justice Alito’s concurrence is intended only to state that Morse does not 
represent a wide-spread broadening of authority on the part of schools to limit 
student speech beyond that in Tinker and its progeny, adding only a category for 
speech that is dangerous to students, it must still be remembered that those cases 
should be seen to support the suppression of hate speech.  Further, the dangers on 
which Justice Alito relied might be argued to include psychological and emotional 
harm,343 which is, after all, a significant portion of the danger to be found in drug 
use. 
Professor Emily Gold Waldman has examined hateful or hurtful student 
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speech in a post-Morse world.344  She divides such speech into two categories, 
distinguishing between speech that identifies and attacks particular students and 
speech expressing political, social, or religious viewpoints, without such a 
particularized focus, and says that the Supreme Court cases indicate that the first 
category should still potentially be subject to regulation.345  The distinction clearly 
comports with Justice Alito’s distinction between the banner in Morse and political 
speech.  Waldman argues that speech that attacks students is similar to the “Bong 
Hits 4 Jesus” banner in that both endanger student safety.346  While she suggests 
that any link between the banner and drug use was weak, “students subjected to 
name-calling or other forms of verbal victimization ‘feel more depressed, anxious, 
and lonely than students who do not view themselves as frequent targets.’  This 
psychological distress . . . can lead to physical illnesses . . . . suicidal ideation” and 
“violent behavior by victimized students.”347 
Expanding on this distinction between speech that attacks and political speech, 
she says: 
[S]uch ad hominem speech—for example, derogatory remarks about another 
student’s appearance, clothing, or personality—will lack any political content at 
all, just like Frederick’s banner.  And even when such speech does possess some 
degree of political content—such as disparagement of a student for his sexual 
orientation or religion—the political aspect of the speech and the ad hominem 
aspect can largely be decoupled.  To put it bluntly, a student could express his 
belief that Jesus Christ is the only path to salvation, or that homosexuality is sinful, 
without singling out non-Christian or gay students and telling them that they are 
going to Hell or calling them derogatory names.348 
She also notes that this distinction is consistent with the statement in Fraser that it 
is a proper function of schools to teach shared values and civility and seems to 
agree with the arguments presented349 that limits on hate speech are consistent with 
Fraser.350 
Waldman goes on, however, to include a statement such as “homosexuality is 
shameful” as expressing a general political, social or religious view with real 
political content.351  Under that concession, a restriction would be justified only if it 
presented a substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others.  She notes that 
[the] courts are unsettled as to whether (1) the “substantial disruption” prong can 
be satisfied by substantial disruption of a single student’s educational experience, 
as opposed to a more widespread disruption; and (2) the “invasion of rights” prong 
can be satisfied in cases where the student speech does not fall into a traditional 
tort category like defamation.352 
                                                                                                     
 344. See Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially Hurtful Speech 
(Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463 (2008). 
 345. Id. at 492. 
 346. Id. at 492-93. 
 347. Id. at 493. 
 348. Id. at 494-95 (citation omitted). 
 349. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 350. Waldman, supra note 344, at 495. 
 351. Id. at 497. 
 352. Id. at 498. 
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On the first issue, Waldman draws guidance from Judge Alito’s opinion in Saxe, 
contending that the disruption of even one student’s education provides sufficient 
justification for limiting student speech.353  On the second issue, she argues that the 
school’s ability to step in should not be limited to situations in which they must 
intervene.354  She seems, then, to see little change resulting from Morse, so long as 
the speech involved is properly analyzed.355 
Mark Cordes has also examined the impact of Morse.356  He sees no significant 
erosion in student speech rights and finds, in Justice Alito’s concurrence, a 
distinction between speech that is at the core of the First Amendment and that 
deserving less protection.357  Political speech, clearly core speech, can be 
suppressed only with a particularly strong showing.358  With regard to hate speech, 
Cordes says 
[then] Judge Alito’s analysis [in Saxe] strongly suggests that even derogatory and 
negative speech that might comment on characteristics of a group identity is 
protected to the extent it involves core religions or religious speech, or involves 
commentary on social issues . . . .  [However,] particularly severe or pervasive 
speech might not be protected . . . .359 
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court said that “where Boroff’s T-shirts contain symbols and words that promote values that are so 
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Perhaps, again, that should come down to a distinction between stating a belief that 
homosexual activity is sinful and comments derogatory toward those of a 
homosexual orientation.  The first is religious or political, while the second is 
purely derogatory.360 
The Alito concurrence in Morse should not be seen as working any real change 
to the position derived from Tinker and Fraser.  It was, after all, Justice Alito’s 
purpose in writing his concurrence to emphasize that he did “not read the opinion 
to mean that there are necessarily any grounds for such regulation that are not 
already recognized in the holdings of this Court.”361  The arguments herein have 
been directed toward demonstrating that limitations on hate speech may be justified 
by the very holdings of the Court that Justice Alito wants to emphasize have not 
been expanded.  Furthermore, his assertion that there are not “necessarily” any 
grounds for expanding restrictions beyond those already recognized falls short of 
saying that there can be no such grounds. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It may be that, either under analysis based on Fraser or on the second prong of 
Tinker, the nation is coming to the realization that school children need to be 
protected from hate speech.  Children may be coming to receive the protection they 
need in school to thrive.  Only in an atmosphere in which their dignity and equality 
are recognized can children obtain the sort of education to which they are entitled.  
Speech that impugns that dignity and equality, speech that is degrading on the basis 
of their race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation ought to be limited by the 
school authorities.  The schools are left with only two choices: They allow the 
                                                                                                     
patently contrary to the school’s educational mission, the School has the authority, under the 
circumstances of this case, to prohibit those T-shirts.”  Id. at 470. 
Cordes said that to the extent that the opinion suggests that a school can ban a T-shirt simply 
because it promotes values that run contrary to the educational mission of the school, it is inconsistent 
with Morse.  Cordes, supra note 356, at 702.  He does say, however, that the speech involved was not 
core speech and that, in fact, the lyrics of some Marilyn Manson songs could be held to present a 
danger.  Id.  He states: 
If the shirts are reasonably understood to represent the lyrics, they can arguably be 
banned, not because the messages are a contrary to a school’s educational mission of 
promoting human dignity and respect for others, but because the message reflected in 
many of the group’s lyrics pose a very real threat to schools. 
Id. 
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Suppression, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 431 (2009).  Curtis states: 
Some religious students, of course, insist that they are not denouncing people.  They say 
they are denouncing sexual acts between people of the same sex—a sinful choice, not a 
status.  But for those of us who see sexual orientation as akin to race, homosexuality and 
heterosexuality are simply part of a person’s identity.  From this perspective, “hate the 
sin, but love the sinner” is akin to “love the black person, hate the blackness.” 
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activities.  An assertion that God demands premarital sexual abstinence is not an attack on 
heterosexuality, and an assertion that sodomy is sinful may not be an attack on homosexuality.  If the 
student is drawing this distinction in the message on the T-shirt, it may not be hate speech. 
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speech and may be seen to agree with its content by children too young to 
understand the intricacies of constitutional law; or, they ban the speech and are 
seen by those children as supportive of the right of all groups to obtain an 
education in a setting of dignity and equality. 
 
